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Programmes and the Appeals Process
Essential Issues 
Fighting cartels is a major priority of EU competition policy. Acting in concert with national com-
petition authorities in the EU, the European Commission (EC) has made considerable efforts to 
promote competitiveness by detecting and punishing cartels. These efforts are visible not only 
in the increasing number of cartel cases, but also in the substantial rise in the average fines im-
posed per cartel member. 
While the successes of past years in fighting cartels clearly hinge to some extent on various pol-
icy reforms, many commentators argue that the introduction of the EC leniency programme (LP) 
in 1996 is likely a key enabler. Generally, LPs offer violators a fine reduction or even full amnesty 
from fines if they disclose an infringement to the responsible authority and cooperate during the 
subsequent investigation. Below, the key results of an empirical ZEW study on the determinants 
of self-reporting under the European LP are presented.
Given the substantial increase in both the number of detected cartels and the average fine per 
cartel member, it comes as no surprise that an increasing number of convicted firms have con-
sidered filing an appeal against EC decisions. Below, the characteristics of firms filing an appeal 
and the factors that determine their success in terms of fine reduction are discussed.
Research Question  
and Relevance
 ͮ ZEW constructed a detailed database of all cartel and cartel appeal cases ruled on by the Euro-
pean Commission, the General Court (GC) or the European Court of Justice (ECJ) between 2000 
and 2012. The database combines case-related, firm group-related and firm-related information. 
 ͮ In an empirical study on the European Leniency Programme, ZEW researchers investigated the 
determinants of self-reporting. The results show that the probability of a firm becoming a chief 
witness increases in conjunction with its status as a repeat offender, the size of the expected 
basic fine, the number of countries active in one group as well as the firm’s market share in 
the cartelized market.
 ͮ In an empirical assessment of the European appeals process in cartel cases, ZEW researchers 
studied both the characteristics of the firm groups filing an appeal and the factors that deter-
mined their success in terms of fine reduction. The results show that some characteristics only 
affect the probability of filing an appeal, while other factors influence both the probability and 
the success of an appeal.
Key Messages
ZEW’s Database on EU Cartel Cases
The availability of a suitable database is a necessary precondition for any empirical assessment 
of cartel enforcement in the European Union. In 2011, ZEW started to construct a detailed data-
base of all cartel cases decided by the European Commission since 2000. The current database 
contains information on all cartel and cartel appeal cases decided by the EC, the GC and the ECJ 
between 2000 and 2012. The data were collected from decisions and press releases published 
by the EC in the course of its investigations as well as from judgment documents provided by the 
online platform CVRIA. 
In particular, the database combines case-related, firm group-related and firm-related information. 
At the case level, information such as the cartel type, cartel duration, number of cartel members, 
affected industry, relevant geographic market(s) and imposed overall fines are available. With a 
view to firm- and group-specific data, the database contains information on the individual length of 
cartel participation, the fine amounts imposed by the EC, whether the firm applied for leniency or 
appealed the EC decision and the value of fine reductions following a successful leniency applica-
tion or appeal. Furthermore, specific factors that are relevant for the calculation of the fine, includ-
ing aggravating and mitigating circumstances or repeat offenders, have been documented as well. 
Study 1: Leniency Programmes as an Instrument for  
Uncovering Cartels in Europe
In many industrial nations leniency programmes have become an indispensable tool for uncov-
ering cartels. Firms that are involved in a cartel benefit from these programmes in the following 
way: as active key witnesses, they can reduce or even entirely avoid the threat of financial penal-
ties – depending on the quality and novelty of the evidence they provide. A recent empirical study 
by ZEW shows how the characteristics of participants in leniency programmes differ from those 
of other firms that have been fined by the European Commission for cartel violations.
In 1996 the European Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for Competition carried out its 
first leniency programme for firms participating in cartels. In so doing, the DG followed the ex-
ample of antitrust authorities in the United States, whose national leniency programme had al-
ready undergone extensive reforms in 1994. Since the initial design of the European leniency 
programme left some questions open from the perspective of firms, the Commission redesigned 
the programme in 2002 by introducing a transparent fine reduction scheme. The scheme made 
it easier for firms to identify the conditions in which they could expect full amnesty from a finan-
cial penalty. In 2006, as part of a further reform, some additional adjustments were made for the 
purpose of clarifying which firm had been the first to make the Commission aware of an existing 
cartel. These adjustments were designed to address the problem of competing leniency applica-
tions of varying quality.
Given that the leniency programme has become such an important instrument for combating car-
tels, questions have arisen concerning the optimal design of the programme as well as the incen-
tive effects it produces for cartel members. Along with theoretical considerations, empirical stud-
ies provide an important basis for evaluating cartel policy and contribute to a better 
understanding of how leniency programmes work.
The collapse of a cartel or the exit of a cartel member from illegal arrangements are the outcomes 
of heterogeneous individual decisions. Since applications for leniency status are rarely submit-
ted simultaneously, it makes sense to examine what distinguishes the firms that submit such an 
application from those that do not.
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The ZEW researchers based their empirical analysis on 76 decisions made by the Commission on 
cartel violations between 2000 and 2010. There were a total of 442 companies included in the 
list of firms involved, including their co-defendant subsidiaries. The researchers examined how 
the firms that won complete cancellation of the fines differed from those ultimately fined by the 
Commission.
The study concluded that prior to the introduction of the revised leniency programme, repeat of-
fenders were only likely to become cooperative if their previous financial penalty exceeded a cer-
tain amount. On the whole, however, after the 2002 revision of the leniency programme, repeat 
offenders were generally more inclined to become cooperative witnesses. The greater the base 
amount of the financial penalty against a cartel member, the more likely it was that this firm would 
testify against its former accomplices. There was a positive correlation between leniency status 
and the extent to which the company group was multinational. A positive correlation was also 
found between leniency status and a firm’s market share in the cartelized market.
From a policy perspective, the study not only confirms existing research by finding a close posi-
tive relationship between the level of fines and the incentive to self-report. It also corroborates 
the value of policy reforms that aim to improve self-reporting incentives for repeat offenders and 
for cartel firms with high market shares. Furthermore, an extension of international cooperation 
among competition authorities is likely to further increase the effectiveness of the European le-
niency programme through the promotion of incentives for cartel members to self-report their 
involvement in an illegal agreement.
 Study 2: The Appeals Process in European Cartel Cases
The losing party in a judicial verdict or administrative decision has the option of having their argu-
ments reheard in an appeals process. To date, little research has been conducted on the company 
characteristics that impact the likelihood of filing and winning an appeal. A recent empirical study 
by ZEW on cartel cases finds the following: the greater the amount of the original fine, the likelier it 
is that a firm will succeed in obtaining a reduction of the penalty through an appeals process.
EU competition law provides for a one- or two-step appeals process. In the first instance, a cartel 
member objecting to the European Commission’s determination of a fine can file an appeal with 
the General Court (GC), which is an EU court downstream from the European Court of Justice. The 
firm that has been fined by the EC can raise objections to the amount of the fine as well as proce-
dural, evidentiary and material aspects of the case. The GC can revoke the fine imposed by the EU 
Commission, increase or decrease the amount of the fine or review the EC’s entire decision. 
In the second instance, the unsuccessful party at the first instance (i.e. the convicted firm or the 
European Commission) can turn to the European Court of Justice, the highest court of appeal in Eu-
rope. The Court of Justice can likewise revoke, raise or lower the fine, however, it limits itself to ques-
tions of law and has no jurisdiction to review the facts or analyse the evidence.
ZEW investigated the characteristics of companies that choose to appeal. In addition, the research-
ers sought to determine the factors that contribute to the success of an appeals process. For this 
purpose, they considered data from 467 groups of firms that were involved in 88 cartels and were 
issued a fine by the EC between 2000 and 2012. A number of the firms under examination had filed 
an appeal with the EU General Court, and some of them had gone on to file a further appeal with 
the European Court of Justice.
The ZEW analysis shows that, on average, the convicted firms belonged to a cartel for 83 months. 
The average fine handed down by the EC amounted to 31 million euros. About five per cent of the 
convicted companies were cartel leaders and close to nine per cent were repeat offenders.       
About half of the company groups examined (234) filed an appeal. Of these, a total of 47 per cent 
were successful. This means that approximately a quarter of all companies examined succeeded in 
getting the court to reduce the original amount of the fine imposed by the EC – by an average of 8.4 
million euros. Among the 109 successful appeals, 34 per cent were accepted on the basis of mate-
rial grounds, and 20 per cent due to incorrect calculation of the fine.
According to the study, a firm’s chances of success in appeals proceedings are greater if it cites more 
than one justification for the appeal. By contrast, the chances of a successful appeal diminish when 
there are multiple appellants and when the EC has prevailed in the appeals proceeding at the first 
instance. When firms cite primarily material grounds and incorrect calculation of the fine in their 
appeal, the fines are reduced more sharply than for all other cited justifications. In addition, the 
greater the original fine imposed by the EU Commission, the greater the reduction upon appeal.
From the viewpoint of political decision-makers and the participating courts of appeal, the ZEW 
findings suggest the advisability of increasing the transparency of the administrative and judicial 
decision-making process – for example, by issuing clear guidelines for rendering judgments. An in-
creased transparency would also reduce the number of frivolous appeals because they are unlike-
lier to succeed. Another finding uncovered by ZEW researchers should provide further incentive for 
reform: both repeat offenders and cartel leaders can count on reduced fines after an appeals pro-
cess. This runs counter to the deterrence concept in European competition law that seeks to punish 
cartel leaders and repeat offenders more harshly. Thus, the researchers recommend that cartel lead-
ership and recidivism should be weighted even more severely in the definition of aggravating cir-
cumstances when setting fines.
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